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Abstract
The adoption of efficient energy and transport technologies often depends on how consumers discount initial investments against later energy savings. Here, we review pertinent consumer discount rates, identify factors affecting consumer preferences, and derive recommendations for promoting energy efficiency. We find that consumers tend to apply a discount rate of 19 ± 14% for efficient energy and transport technologies. Values span a wide range both between and within ± of technology and exceed the market interest rate and the discount rates assumed in cost-benefit analyses. Insight from behavioral sciences suggests high discount rates may not only reflect market failure but consumer preferences in face of liquidity constraints, opportunity costs, transaction costs, and uncertain returns. Considering discount rates as expression of context-specific time and utility preferences provides scope for promoting energy efficiency, through (i) innovative leasing and installment schemes that lower initial investment costs, (ii) accurate product labeling that makes costs and functionalities transparent to consumers, and (iii) extended warranty, replacement, and take-back options that mitigate risk aversion. The inability of consumers to verify energy savings and attribute them to a specific investment has received little attention but constitutes a major barrier for the diffusion of efficient energy and transport technologies.
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1	Introduction
We all discount the future. The present is concrete, certain, and real but the further we look ahead, things become ambiguous, uncertain, and imaginative. Humans, therefore, just act reasonable when they consume benefits immediately but postpone costs to a later point in time. The trade-off between benefits and costs occurring at different times is referred to as inter-temporal decision making (Frederick et al., 2002) and affects virtually all aspects of human life. Unsurprisingly, economists have paid close attention to inter-temporal decisions since the early days of the discipline1. However, it was only in 1937 that Samuelson proposed to express the complex aspects and motivations affecting inter-temporal decision making in a single parameter of time preference, that is, the discount rate. Although Samuelson (1937) cautioned against the empirical validity of his proposal, discount rates were swiftly adopted as means to internalize temporal preferences in economic modeling and cost-benefit analyses.

Energy scientists began recognizing the importance of inter-temporal decisions in the early 1970s, when the first oil crisis spurred efforts to increase energy efficiency in households and industry. Efficient energy technologies tend to be costly at the point of purchase but promise to return the initial investment through energy savings during subsequent product use. As such, deciding about the purchase of a novel and efficient refrigerator or washing machine represents a text-book case of inter-temporal decision making. Insights into the complex inter-temporal trade-offs and time preferences of consumers were thus considered important to forecast the market penetration of efficient energy technologies and to evaluate the impacts of energy policy on the overall energy demand (Hausman, 1979; Meier and Whittier, 1983). 

In the past two decades, concerns over climate change, air pollution, and the supply of fossil fuel have renewed interests in consumer preferences related to efficient energy and transport technologies. With the adoption of a roadmap towards a low-carbon economy in 2050, the European Union (EU) aims to decrease its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 80-95% compared to 1990 levels across the economy (EC, 2011a). The roadmap is supported by specific plans to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy-supply technologies and efficient energy-demand technologies, including electric vehicles for passenger road transport (EC, 2012, 2015). 

Achieving the GHG emissions targets depends on the purchasing and investment decisions of consumers and businesses. Past research suggests that consumers apply discount rates for efficient energy and transport technologies that are higher than the market interest rate (e.g., Haussmann 1979; Meier and Whittier, 1983; Train, 1985; Rudderman et al., 1987; Howarth and Sanstad, 1985; Min et al., 2014). This observation has been attributed to market failure; the foregone cost-effective energy efficiency potential has been referred to as the “energy efficiency gap” (Hirst and Brown, 1990; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). While market failure might have caused high discount rates in the 1970s when energy labels where yet absent, it is questionable whether it still constitutes the major cause behind high discount rates to date. Taking a broader perspective that considers the discount rates for efficient energy technologies in the context of inter-temporal consumer preferences and decisions may reveal new and more comprehensive insights that can assist in: (i) modeling of technology diffusion in energy and CO2 emissions scenarios and (ii) designing effective energy and climate policies.

Here, we attempt to make inter-temporal consumer decisions on efficient energy and transport technologies more transparent. We review relevant literature with the aim to identify: (i) consumer discount rates for efficient energy and transport technologies, (ii) factors that influence inter-temporal purchasing decisions of consumers, and (iii) measures of policy makers and industry stakeholders that could decrease consumer discount rates. Our research can thereby help increase the willingness of consumers to invest in novel and efficient, yet expensive, technologies. 

The paper continues with a description of our methods in Section 2. In Section 3, we present a conceptual framework that captures the factors behind inter-temporal decisions. In Section 4, we provide an overview of consumer discount rates applied to efficient energy and transport technologies. We finish with a discussion and conclusions in Sections 5 and 6.




2	Methods
Throughout this paper, we use the term ‘consumer discount rate’ (Meier and Whittier, 1983) synonymously to also mean ‘individual discount rate’ (Harrison et al., 2002), ‘personal discount rate’ (Warner and Pleeter, 2001) or ‘implicit discount rate’ (Greene, 1983). The consumer discount rate depicts the rate of annual return from saved or produced energy at which consumers are indifferent between the purchase of an efficient but expensive versus a less efficient and cheap energy or transport technology (e.g., Meier and Whittier, 1983). We limit our review to discount rates applied by consumers and disregard those of businesses and the public sector. Consumers typically do not calculate or know their discount rate but they implicitly reveal it through their purchasing decisions. By contrast, businesses tend to derive their discount rates in an explicit manner through a rigid benchmarking of costs, benefits, and risk related to competing investment options. We also exclude from our review social discount rates applied in the public sector to evaluate the total costs and benefits of investments from a societal perspective (see, e.g., Steinbach and Staniaszek, 2015). 

To identify the range of implicit consumer discount rates, we conduct a scoping review (Grant and Booth, 2009) of the English literature, namely:
	peer-refereed papers identified through ‘scopus’ and ‘researchgate’;
	scientific reports, presentations, workshop documents, and working papers identified through a standard ‘google’ search. 

We search the internet by using the key words: “consumer discount rate,” “implicit discount rate,” and “individual discount rate” in combinations with the terms “transport,” “energy,” “technology,” and “passenger cars.” Through this search, we identified a total of 36 relevant documents published before August 2016 that quantify consumer discount rates for energy and transport technologies. Out of these, 23 constitute peer-refereed papers, 10 research reports, and 3 other sources of information such as books and conference presentations (see Table S1 in the Supplementary Data). We do not claim to have covered the entirety of all relevant studies published; yet, we would expect that the studies identified here provide a representative coverage of the consumer discount rates typically assumed for efficient energy and transport technologies. We verify this hypothesis with a simple statistical analysis by calculating the sample size N that is required to determine the discount rate r with a given accuracy A:

									         (Equation 1)

The factor 1.960 represents the tabulated Z-value of the normal distribution at a confidence interval of 95% and S stands for the standard deviation of the identified discount rates. We characterize the statistical properties of the sample of collected discount rates by calculating mean, standard deviation, median, quartiles and the coefficients of skewness. Data screening suggests that the distribution of discount rates is positively skewed. We therefore decided to characterize the overall and technology-specific samples of discount rates by the median and half of the inter-quartile range rather than by the mean and standard deviation. 

Our data analysis is complemented by a literature survey to identify: (i) approaches to quantify discount rates, (ii) factors guiding inter-temporal purchasing decisions, and (iii) factors affecting consumer discount rates for specific technologies. The insights from the literature survey complement the review of discount rates to derive recommendations for promoting energy efficiency.


3 	Inter-temporal decision making
3.1	General aspects
Decisions that involve trade-offs between costs and benefits occurring at different times (Frederick et al., 2002) are omnipresent. They often confront humans implicitly or explicitly with an investment challenge: Is it worth materializing a benefit (e.g., maintaining financial liquidity, keeping an asset, having a meal) now or would it be better to delay it in exchange of reward (e.g., interest, advanced education, skill, or physical fitness)? Attending university or going to work could be considered possible responses to such a challenge just as the purchase of an efficient yet expensive freezer. As the present is certain but the future is not, one feature of inter-temporal decisions is that humans tend to demand excess compensation when delaying a benefit but are willing to incur additional costs for delaying a detriments. Inter-temporal decisions are case specific and depend on a multitude of aspects, most obviously: (i) the perceived magnitude of benefits and costs; (ii) the time duration of the delay; (iii) uncertainty about returns; and (iv) contextual and procedural features such as substitutability, transaction costs, and opportunity costs. In the actual decision making process, humans are often unable to know and account in a quantitative manner for all relevant aspects but, instead, incorporate these implicitly. 


3.2	Formalizing time discounting
Since the nineteenth century, economists have discussed factors and psychological aspects behind time preference and inter-temporal decisions. A formal approach to capture time preference and time discounting was introduced by Samuelson (1937), who proposed to comprise relevant factors into one single parameter, that is, the discount rate as a “cardinal measure of utility” (Frederick et al., 2002). The underlying discounted-utility model captures a person’s inter-temporal preference for a bundle of available goods (ct to cT) by an inter-temporal utility function Ut(ct to cT) that equates the sum of the instantaneous utility from consumption and the discount function over a given time horizon T:

					           (Equation 2)

where u(ct+k) represents the instantaneous utility function (i.e., the satisfaction obtained from consuming good ct in the future t + k),  represents the discount function (i.e., the relative weight attached in period t  to the utility in period t + k), and r represents the discount rate indicating a universal time preference.2 The discount function is widely adopted in neo-classical economics as the framework for analyzing inter-temporal decisions. 

For energy and transport technologies, the discount rate r allows to express the value of financial returns from energy that is produced or saved in the future in terms of its present-day value. A low versus high discount rate, ceteris paribus, suggests that a consumer demands low versus high future returns to make an investment. A negative discount rate suggests that an investment is made even if the future returns are lower than the initial investment, that is, if an efficient energy or transport technology cannot recover the efficiency investments through energy savings along its life cycle. Daziano and Wang (2015) express the discount rate r as the ratio between the marginal utility of an initial investment βP and the future returns from energy savings βE. This way, the discount rate r is equivalent to the inverse of (i) the willingness to pay now for marginal energy savings at a later point (WTPE) and (ii) the acceptable payback time (PBT) expressed in years:

 								         (Equation 3)

In cost-benefit calculations, the discount rate r allows to express the returns R of an investment I in present-day terms and benchmark them against the investment I through the calculation of the so-called net present value (NPV):3

						         (Equation 4)

where N represents the lifetime of a product [a] and t the specific year under consideration. The NPV thereby assigns an increasing price to returns (R) that arrive at a later point in time. A positive NPV suggests that an investment is profitable and should be made at the chosen discount rate. Based on Equation 4, the discount rate (r) can be calculated at which the NPV of an investment reaches zero (i.e., the present value of an investment equals the present value of returns generated in the future). The resulting discount rate is referred to as the internal rate of return (IRR) and fulfills the criterion:

 							         (Equation 5)

If applied to purchasing decisions of consumers, the cost-benefit calculations in Equations 4 and 5 assumes consumers are able and willing to quantify the trade-offs between present costs and future benefits by means of a discount rate. They further assume that discount rates remain constant over the entire investment horizon, that is, the life time of an energy or transport technology (Frederick et al., 2002). Before discussing, the limitation of these and other assumptions underlying the formulation of discount rates, we first focus on approaches to quantify discount rates.


3.3	Empirical quantification of discount rates
Discount rates are quantified using: (i) choice experiments in which respondents are asked to complete surveys or questionnaires involving real or hypothetical outcomes (e.g., Hausman, 1979; Min et al., 2014; Daziano and Wang, 2015) and (ii) field observations of actual purchasing decisions made by individuals in the real world (e.g., Meier and Whittier, 1983; Sirgin, 2013). Choice experiments comprise four types (Frederick et al., 2002), in which respondents are required to: 
	choose between one or multiple small immediate rewards and larger delayed rewards; choices may be presented individually or in a series of varying time delay or amount of reward offered; such choice tasks represent the most common method to elicit discount rates but they are vulnerable to anchoring effects (i.e., respondents subconsciously adjust their response to match the presented alternatives) and sequence dependency (i.e., the sequence of presented choices affects the respondents’ preferences); 
	fill in blanks by indicating an acceptable monetary amount or time delay that would make two choices equally desirable; such matching tasks reveal (unlike choice tasks) an indifference point and thus yield directly the discount rate of respondents; moreover, matching tasks do not specify choice alternatives, therefore preventing anchoring effects;
	specify the willingness to pay or accept compensation for real or hypothetical outcomes at specific times in the future (referred to as pricing tasks);
	evaluate an outcome occurring at a specific time by rating its attractiveness (referred to as rating tasks).

Pricing tasks and rating tasks are both subject to anchoring effects but allow altering the delay time of rewards presented to different respondents (Frederick et al., 2002). The outcome of choice experiments can be used to establish discrete choice models through the application of logistic regression, probit regression, or hedonic regression, which ultimately allow the estimation of consumer discount rates (Wang and Daziano, 2015). 

Choice experiments largely control for visceral influences, minimize transaction costs, and do generally not require that respondents actually execute their choices. However, the result discount rates reflect hypothetical rather than actual behavior. Moreover, choice experiments assume forward-looking respondents and may not sufficiently account for the importance of past experiences in inter-temporal decision making (Bartels and Urminsky, 2015). 

Field observations, by contrast, estimate discount rates based on real-world consumer behavior and therefore have ecological validity (Frederick et al., 2002). They are often the preferred method to determine consumer discount rates for efficient energy and transport technologies; a first comprehensive review of discount rates applied to such technologies was provided by Train (1985). To estimate discount rates, field observations of actual purchasing decisions are complemented with information about energy prices, use patterns, and the efficiency of the technology under consideration (Train, 1985). Discount rates identified this way reflect, however, the specific conditions under which purchasing decisions were made. As individuals differ from each other in, e.g., their living environment and decision making process, the inferred discount rates are case specific and may have limited general validity.


3.4	Factors guiding inter-temporal decisions
The discounted-utility model proposed by Samuelson (1937) incorporates the discount rate r as a parameter of a universal and constant time preference, assuming that the time preference of consumers for diverse items like money, food, or efficient energy and transport technologies is identical and invariant with respect to time and context. Under perfect market conditions (characterized by, e.g., transitivity, complete information, absence of transaction costs, continuity in preference), the discount rate should approximately match the market interest rate; any larger deviations between the two parameters hint to irrational consumer behavior, inefficient choices, or behavioral errors that diminish the overall well-being of consumers (e.g., Hausman, 1979). However, when adopting insights from behavioral sciences, psychology, and plane life experience, it becomes apparent that the assumptions of a universal time preference and perfect market may often not apply. Frederick et al. (2002) examined the explicit and implicit assumptions underlying Samuelson’s (1937) discounted utility model (Table 1). Their conclusions support Soman et al. (2005) who labeled the discounted-utility model as “merely a paramorphic representation” of reality.

Table 1:	Explicit and implicit assumptions behind the discounted-utility model and their applicability to reality (based on Frederick et al. (2002), Ubfal (216))
Time preference and utility as modeled	Time preference and utility in real-life situations
-constant over time	-may change in predictable and unpredictable manners through interference with past decisions and other consumption and investment options; discount rates may decrease with increasing time horizons2, an observation referred to as hyperbolic discounting
-constant across all forms of consumption	-often case- and product-specific; gains, small amounts, and avoided delays are discounted higher than losses, large amounts, and expedite receivables; time preference may depend on whether choices are evaluated together or in isolation
-indifferent regarding delay, acceleration, or sequence of choices	-may change and even reverse depending on the timing and sequence consumption alternatives are offered  
-independent of the nature of past or expected future consumption	-often depend on the nature of past and expected future consumption
-utility of sequential consumption equals discounted sum of utilities in each period of consumption	-consumers may prefer distinct pattern of utility over time
-newly occurring consumption alternatives are evaluated in view of existing consumption plans and their implied changes for the utility of aggregate consumption	-persons may not have plans about future consumption or may be unable to re-compute the optimal plan for each newly occurring consumption alternative

Likewise, imperfect markets and the diversity of living conditions provide ample reasons for why the discount rates vary between consumers and why they tend to differ from the average market interest rate (e.g., Train, 1983; Ubfal, 2015). Liebermann and Ungar (2002) point out that the market interest rate itself is not equal for all consumers but differs depending on the saving, lending, and borrowing conditions individuals face in financial markets. Deviations between consumer discount rates and the market interest rate become plausible when considering consumers as individuals who are faced with a variety of living conditions and whose purchasing decisions are motivated by complex situational and subjective preferences and utility considerations. Therefore, discount rates might be best understood as an overall indicator of subjective context-specific preferences at a given point in time, comprising three distinct elements: (i) time preference in its strict sense, (ii) utility preference, and (iii) efficiency of the decision-making process (Figure 1). The complexity and case-specificity of inter-linkages, trade-offs, and cross-dependencies make it difficult to determine experimentally the actual contribution of these elements to the discount rate applied by each consumer. Figure 2 attempts to provide a glimpse of underlying factors, including personal traits, context such as immediate goals and aspirations, general living conditions, product characteristics, opportunity costs, transaction costs, and perception of present and future uncertainties which, in sum, render discount rates subjective and variable (Figure 2).


Figure 1: 	Elements determining the consumer discount rate for a typical purchasing decision

Thus, there can be numerous reasons why consumers apply high discount rates when purchasing efficient energy and transport technologies. Taking the market interest rate as a benchmark, consumers are likely to deviate in a positive direction when accounting for factors such as (Hausman, 1979; Train, 1983; Frederick et al., 2002; Ubfal, 2015; Daziano and Wang, 2015):
	liquidity constraints;3
	opportunity costs - resulting from consumption alternatives and competing life objectives (see Figure A1 in the Appendix); the assumption of a decision dichotomy between keeping savings in the bank versus purchasing an expensive but efficient energy technology may oversimplify reality;4 
	transaction costs and inertia - resulting from (i) lack of information about the energy consumption, use-phase costs, durability, and functionality of a technology, (ii) lack of trust and expertise to utilize the provided information, and (iii) scale effects, i.e., for small monetary returns, consumers may simply disregard efficiency in the face of competing purchasing motives such as design, functionality, brand (in other words: Who considers energy efficiency when buying a watch?);
	uncertainty - resulting from: (i) unknown returns due to volatility in energy prices, use patterns, as well as uncertain product functionality, reliability, and durability, (ii) inability to verify energy savings and attribute them to a specific investment, (iii) inaccuracy of available product information (e.g., provided through product labels), (iv) uncertain future inflation, income, expenditures, preferences, and consumption, and (v) potentially foregone utility of available cash in the face of any upcoming consumption and investment alternatives;
	societal attitudes, social proof, and risk aversion - resulting in peer pressure in favor of incumbent technologies (“If anybody does not have it, nobody wants it” may summarize the problem);
	split incentives - resulting from principal-agent problems;
	visceral influences and bounded rationality - resulting in short-sightedness, biased beliefs, and irrationality.

Specifically the purchase of passenger cars is often motivated by considerations other than the financial cost-benefit performance (e.g., Mau et al., 2008) and may include engine power, transport capacity, or status-seeking as the recent trend towards larger and more powerful electric cars (Zerfass et al., 2017) suggests. For household appliances, another aspects warrants attention:  Consumers who purchase an efficient appliance can neither verify whether a declared efficiency yields proportional energy savings nor can they attribute savings to a specific investment. Instead, the returns from efficiency investments remain hidden in the overall energy bill. Uncertainties related to product performance and realized energy savings are arguably a critical factor behind the high discount rates for efficient energy-demand technologies. 

Moreover, looking at discount rates solely from a cost-benefit perspective disregards the fact that efficiency improvements are often associated with changes in product design, functionality, and durability3. The effects of such technological differences are usually not considered when discussing the energy efficiency gap. Accounting for them and the factors discussed above when considering consumer preferences suggests the often cited energy efficiency gap or paradox (e.g., Hirst and Brown, 1990; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Gillingham and Palmer 2013, Ameli and Brandt, 2015) makes “reference to a model that was constructed without regard to its descriptive validity” (Frederick et al., 2002). 


Figure 2:	Factors affecting the implicit discount rates applied by consumers

Our view that high discount rates do not stem from irrational consumer behavior is supported by Liebermann and Ungar (2002) who found that the majority of consumers make efficient choices that reflect their stated time preferences. 

The factors discussed above can help explain high consumer discount rates and the differences in the discount rates applied by individuals to efficient energy and transport technologies. If humans differ in some of the factors presented in Figure 2, their implicit discount rates are highly individual and can vary across a large range. It may therefore be unfeasible to determine with accuracy one single discount rate that captures a universal time and utility preference of all consumers.

Adopting this view helps to understand the consumer discount rates applied in the real-world. Indeed, the factors listed in Figure 2 present a variety of starting points for policy makers and industry to lower consumer discount rates; we discuss these in Section 4.2.


4	Results
From 36 literature sources, we identify a total of 298 discount rates that refer to 9 categories of technology (see Table S2 in the Supplementary Data). The discount rates range from -164% to 764% (Figure 3). The overall median discount rate reaches 19%. The lower and higher quartiles are located at 9% and 42%, respectively suggesting half of the inter-quartile range reaches 17%. The overall mean and standard deviation of our sample is 40 ± 78%, albeit these parameters do not reliably represent the general tendency in our data as discount rates are non-normally distributed (see below). Choosing the median and half of the interquartile range (19 ± 17%) to represent our data, we estimate with Equation 3 that consumers tend to expect payback times for their efficiency investments of some 5 ± 6 years. Our findings are consistent with the average discount rate of 29 ± 27% (median and half of the interquartile range) identified in choice experiments on financial rewards (data presented by Wang and Danziano, 2015). 

In accordance with the literature (e.g., Sanstad et al., 2006; Ameli and Brandt, 2015), the discount rates identified here for efficient energy and transport technologies exceed on average the market interest rate. However, we also observe negative discount rates suggesting that consumers at occasions purchase efficient technologies even if the returns in energy savings do not compensate the initial investment. In line with discussion in Section 3.4, this finding points to non-financial motives affecting the purchasing decisions of consumers.


Figure 3:	Relative frequency distribution of consumer discount rates (Data sources: see Tables S1 and S2 in the Supplementary Data)

Our findings that the median is lower than the mean, suggests a positively skewed distribution of discount rates. In fact, Pearson’s first and second skewness coefficient of 0.27 and 0.80, respectively, confirm this hypothesis. The discount rates for individual technologies vary both within and between technologies (Figure 4); energy-efficient lighting appears to show higher values that scatter over a wider range than those for, e.g., light-duty vehicles. This finding could be explained by the general observation that consumers discount small monetary amounts more than larger ones. Daziano and Wang (2015) have observed such a trend; Frederick et al. (2002) have discussed this phenomenon in the general context of inter-temporal decision-making. Moreover, the observation that discount rates for efficient light-duty vehicles often assume negative values (see Table S2 in the Supplementary Information) points again to the importance of non-monetary factors such as, e.g., the acquisition of social status and peer confirmation are purchasing criteria.


Figure 4:	Median consumer discount rates for efficient energy and transport technologies; error bars represent half of the inter-quartile range of values (Data sources: see Tables S1 and S2 in the Supplementary Data)

Overall, discount rates do not converge towards one universal value over time (Figure 5); instead, discount rates in individual years span a wide range. Frederick et al. (2002) have made similar observations, which support our earlier arguments that suggest discount rates can be expected to vary as they represent are personal, context-specific, and product-specific indicators of subjective time and utility preferences. The range of values observed for individual technologies raises the question about the minimum sample size required to estimate average discount rates with meaningful accuracy. Figure 6 depicts the sample size based on standard deviations of the discount rates observed for the 9 categories of technology displayed in Figure 4. Our results suggest that often samples of >10,000 observations are required to estimate discount rates with an accuracy ± 5 percentage points.


Figure 5:	Consumer discount rates as a function of the year of publication; for cases in which the base year of the analysis differs from the year of publication, we depict here the base year of the respective analyses (Data sources: see Tables S1 and S2 in the Supplementary Data)

This number represents a conservative estimate; sample sizes might even need to be larger to account for the small samples used to estimate standard deviations and the observation that the distribution of discount rates is not normal but slightly skewed. Taken together, Figure 6 highlights the challenges of empirically capturing and quantifying with meaningful accuracy the complexity of personal motives underlying purchasing decisions.

By plotting discount rates as a function of income, we find an inverse power-law relationship between the two parameters (Figure 7). Interestingly, the discount rates found by Berkovec et al. (1983) for space heating technologies decline at a lower rate (17 ± 3% with each doubling of income than the discount rates for thermal insulation (ADL, 1984), room air conditioning (Hausman, 1979), light bulbs (Min et al., 2014), and conventional and electric cars (Lave and Train, 1978; Beggs and Cardell, 1980; Beggs et al., 1981; Train and Lohrer, 1982). The discount rates for the latter group of technologies show a consistent decline of 48 ± 2% with each doubling of income. 



Figure 6:	Minimum sample sizes for estimating consumer discount rates for energy and transport technologies at a given accuracy

Meier and Whittier (1983) hint to the observation that persons making a decision to purchase an efficient appliance may do so even when applying diverging discount rates. Calculating the discount rates implied by actual purchases of efficient refrigerators under different assumptions for electricity prices and expected lifetime yields values of 1% to 102% (Figure 8). This result highlights that:
	consumers making the same purchasing decision may do so based on diverging motives and considerations (exemplified here by the variability in plausible expectations about future electricity prices and product lifetime);
	high discount rates may not per se prohibit the adoption of efficient energy and transport technologies. 


,
Figure 7: 	Normalized consumer discount rates as a function of normalized income; income and discount rates are normalized to the base year of the analysis; we depict here mid-range values wherever income ranges are given in the respective studies; elasticity depicts the percentage decline of the discount rate with each doubling of income; DR – discount rate; Y – income (Data sources: Lave and Train (1978), Hausman (1979), Beggs and Cardell (1980), Beggs et al. (1981), Train and Lohrer (1982), Berkovec et al. (1983), ADL (1984), Min et al. (2014))


Figure 8: 	Discount rates implied by the purchase of efficient refrigerators for plausible assumptions about electricity price (expressed here as U.S. dollars) and expected lifetime as calculated by Meier and Whittier (1983) based on actual sales data


5	Discussion
5.1	Strengths, limitations, and implications of the research
This paper provides a critical review of consumer discount rates for efficient energy and transport technologies. The identified discount rates range around 19 ± 17% (median ± half of the interquartile range) and often exceed the market interest rate. Our findings can provide input for cost-benefit assessments and technology forecasting in greenhouse gas emissions and energy scenarios. Yet, the large variability of discount rates raises doubts about the existence of a universal rate of time preference, suggesting that: 
	purchasing decisions depend on context-specific time and utility preferences of individuals - case-specific discount rates may need to be determined to capture these; 
	larger samples than those used here are necessary to estimate the average discount rate for individual technologies with reasonable accuracy (see Figure 6); and
	the application of discount rates to forecast technology deployment will remain highly uncertain, if not speculative.

Should we then abandon efforts to estimate discount rates? We do not think so. Monitoring discount rates can provide insights into the propensity of consumers to invest into novel and efficient technologies. It can also reveal the motives behind purchasing decisions and thereby provide cues for policies supporting the adoption of efficient energy and transport technologies (see also Section 5.2). Monitoring of discount rates can also verify the plausibility of assumptions made in cost-benefit assessments and the modeling of technology diffusion. Our findings, for example, suggest that the discount rates typically applied for the cost-benefit assessments of technologies (e.g., 3-20% applied by Weiss et al. (2010), Steinbach and Staniaszek (2015), Brandão de Vasconcelos et al.(2016)) are too low and overestimate (i) the willingness of consumers to adopt efficient technologies and (ii) the economic benefits of energy efficiency. We propose that cost-benefit assessments adopt at least in one scenario discount rates of at least 40% (which represents the upper quartile in our data sample)  to reflect real-world consumer decisions more accurately. 

The various motives behind inter-temporal decisions (see Section 3.4) suggest market failure and irrational consumer behaviour may be one of many plausible explanations for very high discount rates. We are skeptical about the notion that consumers act irrationally, in the sense that they make inadequate use of reason, when deciding about efficient energy and transport technologies (e.g., Gately, 1980; Hausman, 1979; Meier and Whittier, 1983; Ruderman et al., 1987; Hassett and Metcalf, 1993; Howarth and Sanstad, 1995). Such a notion stems from a narrow neo-classical perspective on inter-temporal decision making that overemphasizes the financial cost-benefits and neglects contextual and situational aspects in the decision making process. Adopting a behavioral perspective on inter-temporal decisions reveals opportunity and transaction costs, and various sources of uncertainty (e.g., volatility of energy prices, unknown product functionality and durability, intensity of use, and return on investment) that make the application of high discount rates plausible. The observation that discount rates tend to increase with decreasing income highlights the importance of social policies to address poverty traps in which low-income and liquidity-constrained households are unable to invest in novel technologies, are precluded from efficiency benefits, and instead remain bound to high usage costs of outdated technology. 


5.2	Measures to decrease consumer discount rates
If discount rates are not constant but vary in a case-specific manner, there is scope for policies to affect them to promote the adoption of efficient energy and transport technologies. In general, consumers are willing to invest in efficient technologies ceteris paribus if: (i) the magnitude of the investment is small in absolute terms, (ii) the magnitude of the return is high (both in absolute and relative terms), (iii) the uncertainty of the return is low and quantifiable, (iii) the returns arrive in the near rather than distant future, and (iv) the overall product characteristics are known and at least equally desirable compared to those of conventional technologies. Support policies that can address several of these aspects will likely be more effective and less prone to free-riding than those that address only one specific aspect (see below and Table A1 in the appendix).

The magnitude of the investment is given by the price premium of a technology that can be decreased through subsidies, tax credits, rebates, and payments through installments. Such measures are, however, only effective if non-financial product features do not constitute a major market barrier. Electric vehicles provide a counter example. Price subsidies of 4,000 EUR (4,800 USD) per vehicle that are granted in Germany remain largely ineffective in accelerating the deployment of electric cars in face on insufficient recharging infrastructure and short drive ranges (see, e.g., Zerfass et al., 2017). Price subsidies are also problematic from a social point of view because high-income households (that already tend to apply comparatively low discount rates, see Figure 7) would be the first to benefit. By contrast, for low-income households (that tend to apply comparatively high discount rates) subsidies may not lower the discount rates sufficiently to make them purchase an efficient technology. Subsidies may thereby also not mitigate the risk of poverty traps faced by low-income households through high energy costs and the inability to replace inefficient and outdated equipment. 

Leasing schemes, by contrast, can address both high initial investment costs and uncertainty related to unknown technological features. Leasing schemes were found to be effective in opening a new market for photovoltaics in the USA (Sigrin, 2013). Similar to subsidies, leasing alleviates cash flow issues. Moreover, leasing can lower information barriers, and allows consumers to externalize risks related to unknown product functionality and durability that may otherwise prevent them from buying a novel and efficient technology. As Sigrin (2013) observed, leasing enabled financially constrained consumers to install photovoltaic systems in spite of an otherwise restrictively high discount rate of 30 ± 39%, that exceeds the 7 ± 6% applied by persons who were willing to buy a photovoltaic system. We therefore argue that leasing schemes, in combination with extended warranty and take-back options, present a viable measure to decrease risk aversion, bridge information asymmetry, and accelerate the adoption of novel and efficient technologies. Leasing could be implemented as part of the ‘sharing economy’ allowing consumers to pay for assets or services on-demand rather than owning them. Leasing also offers a whole range of new business opportunities for industry, utility companies, and municipalities that could capitalize on the margin between market interest rate and consumer discount rate - to the benefit of both businesses and consumers5.

Minimum efficiency standards and energy taxes may present the silver bullet to force efficiency upon the market; yet, such measures are often politically difficult to implement, may prolong replacement intervals, and need to be complemented by social policies to ensure low-income households have adequate access to novel technologies. Minimum efficiency standards also force technological learning as manufacturers can no longer cash in on established technologies but are forced to innovate in a competitive market.6 

In our opinion, policy makers and industry could spend more attention to decrease consumer uncertainty when purchasing efficient energy and transport technologies. Labeling schemes are implemented in many parts of the world to decrease information asymmetry and thereby consumer discount rates (Min et al., 2014). Yet, the majority of labels does not yet specify energy savings in monetary terms. Such information was found to be the most important element in guiding cost-efficient energy efficiency investments (Newell and Siikamäki, 2013). However, to be effective, labels have to accurately reflect the energy consumption of technologies under real-world conditions.7 Inconsistencies have been reported for the EU car label (e.g., Haq and Weiss, 2016); more recently, discrepancies of 20-30% were identified between labeled and actual electricity consumption of household appliances (SZ, 2017). Such inaccuracies not only decrease consumer trust in a label but in the performance of the technology in general which compromises efforts to deploy efficient technologies. 

Although considerable effort is being spent on labelling, policy makers have neglected the fact that product labels do not yet provide consumers with concrete proof their efficiency investments generate returns. With the exception of fuel meters in passenger cars, consumers cannot verify whether the realized energy savings actually have justified an investment. Any potential energy savings from household appliances remain hidden in the household’s energy bill. 8 In view of the factors determining inter-temporal decisions (see Section 3.4), we regard the absence of transparency and verifiability an important reason for high discount rates. Ways should be found to display the amount of energy used, saved, and the financial returns materialized relative to the market average product, for example on the front panel of refrigerators or boilers of through smartphone apps. The provision of such information could boost efficiency beyond what labelling and other measures could achieve and may, moreover, create consumer awareness for their daily energy use.

Finally, discount rates can be decreased by stimulating positive peer feedback. As Meier and Whittier (1983) report, sales of energy-efficient refrigerators increased after a consumer magazine published recommendations. We would view the provision of confirmatory information, for example, through consumer organizations or governmental certificates, as important for stimulating confidence whenever the functionality and durability of novel technologies are unknown to consumers. Status consumption and snob-value effects could be exploited by marketing efficiency as a distinct product feature linked to an overall superior product. Efficient technologies that cannot repay their price premium can become desirable - not despite but because of their high price (Hausman, 1979).9


6	Conclusions and recommendations
We deduce the following conclusions and recommendations from our research:
	The discount rates for efficient energy and transport technologies span a wide range (Figure 3) around an average of 19 ± 17% (median ± half of the interquartile range).
	Discount rates are not technology specific (Figure 4), tend to exceed the market interest rate and the discount rates typically implemented in cost-benefit analysis; the latter leads to a positive bias that overestimates the efficiency benefits of energy and transport technologies.
	There may be no one single interest rate that captures all consumer preferences with regard to efficient energy and transport technologies; instead discount rates are best understood as case-specific representations of time preference, utility preference, and choice efficiency underlying purchasing decisions.
	Explaining negative or, alternatively, very high discount rates (Figure 3) with market failure and irrational consumer behavior reflects a narrow perspective on consumer preferences that neglects important aspects such as transaction costs, opportunity costs, non-financial motives, and a wide range of uncertainties facing consumers when deciding about the purchase of efficient energy and transport technologies. 
	Policy makers and industry stakeholders can derive cues about the effectiveness of measures to promote efficiency from the monitoring of consumer discount rates for efficient energy and transport technologies.
	The inability of consumers to verify the returns of efficiency investments arguably presents an important reason for high discount rates of energy technologies, predominantly, those used in households. Industry should consider displaying through smart phone apps or on the front panel of, e.g., refrigerators or boilers, the amount of energy used, saved, and the financial returns generated relative to the market average. The provision of such information could boost efficiency and increase consumer awareness for their energy consumption.
	Leasing schemes, possibly in combination with smart metering, an extended warranty, and take-back options, could effectively lower the discount rates of consumers that are risk averse and financially constrained. Through capitalizing on the gap between consumer discount rates and market interest rate, leasing schemes present untapped business opportunities for industry, utility companies, and municipalities.
	We are critical about price subsidies as the sole measure to support efficient energy and transport technologies as these are (i) prone to free-riding, (ii) inadequate to address low-income households that risk being caught in a poverty-trap, and (iii) ineffective wherever non-monetary factors such as product functionality prevent the market diffusion of a technology.
	The effectiveness of product labels in decreasing discount rates can be enhanced by providing consumers with accurate information about the real-world energy use, the yearly energy costs, and the price trend of energy in the past.
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Appendix
Figure A1:	Consumption and investment options available to consumers and their relevant uncertainties; bold dotted line confines the two classical scenarios of keeping savings in the bank versus purchasing an efficient but expensive energy or transport technologies; dotted black lines depict alternative spending of bank savings; green boxes and lines depict investment and consumptions options when savings are insufficient for purchasing an efficient energy or transport technology

Table A1:	Selected policy measures to decrease implicit consumer discount rates for efficient energy and transport technologies; strengths and weaknesses may reflect judgment of the authors
Objective: Decreasing the magnitude of initial investment
Measure	Strengths	Weaknesses
Price subsidies	- mitigates liquidity constraints- breaks prohibitive mental accounting patterns that assign specific price targets to a given technologies	- burdens public financial budgets and decreases governmental spending elsewhere- most beneficial for wealthy consumers whose discount rates are relatively low - limited effectiveness, if characteristics and functionalities of efficient technology are either unknown or deviant from those of incumbent technologies
Tax credits (e.g., reduced value added tax)	- same as above	- same as above
Rebates and attractive payment through installment	- same as above- effectiveness increases with length of payment period	- same as above (burdens the public budget only if subsidized) 
Taxation of inefficient products	- breaks prohibitive patterns of mental accounting- generates governmental revenues- increases the efficiency of products sold-accelerates technological learning	- may decrease overall demand and delay product replacement- may preclude low-income households from consumption in the absence of complementary measures- risk to be ineffective if consume characteristics deviate from those of incumbent technologies
Minimum efficiency standards	- increases the efficiency of products offered on the market- addresses (in combination with complementary measures) the poverty trap of liquidity-constrained consumers-accelerates technological learning of efficient technologies as manufacturers can no longer capitalize on outdated technology	- may decrease demand and delay product replacement- may preclude liquidity constraint households from consumption in the absence of complementary measures- requires continuous monitoring and adaptation
Product leasing	- same as above- mitigates uncertainty related to the performance and durability of efficient technologies- effectiveness demonstrated for energy-supply technologies (Sigrin, 2013)- offers new business opportunities for utility companies and municipalities (specifically if coupled with smart-metering)- may be equally beneficial for high- and low-income households- may boost replacement of outdated products in use	- ownership status may distract consumers- if coupled with smart metering, standardization may be required to ensure accuracy of information- might require awareness campaigns to be widely adopted
Dedicated loans	- effective for both- high and low-income households	- may be subject to rebound effects due to the purchase of larger products- risk of poverty trap for low-income households- limited effectiveness, if characteristics and functionalities of efficient technology are either unknown or deviant from those of incumbent technologies
Objective: Increasing magnitude and decreasing time delay of the return
Measure	Strengths	Weaknesses
Taxing energy consumption	- increases returns from energy savings- limits efficiency rebounds- generates government revenue- allows consumers to freely re-allocate their spending	- may deepen poverty trap for financially constrained consumers in the absence of complementary social policies- has to be complemented by labelling and information campaigns to make product performance transparent to consumers
General research and development support	- improves product efficiency- accelerates use novel and efficient technologies	- hidden business subsidy that may distort the market- risk of wasteful spending and free riding- limits governmental spending elsewhere
Objective: Decreasing uncertainty
Measure	Strengths	Weaknesses
Displaying to consumers the energy and cost savings accumulated during product use 	- makes returns visible and verifiable to consumers- reinforces purchasing decision- provides a means to spread awareness among peers- increases awareness of energy consumption of household technologies	- ensuring accuracy of information may necessitate standardization and monitoring
Extended product warranty	- creates trust in new technology	- increases product price
Extended take-back and pay-back options	- decreases risk aversions- creates trust in new technology	- increases product price
Product labeling	- makes product performance and use-phase costs transparent to consumers- removes information asymmetry	- accuracy of information is absolutely critical; inaccuracy may distract consumers for a long time from the consumption of wider range of efficient products-requires continuous monitoring and updating- effectiveness depends on consumer trust in and recognition of the label- consumers are informed but not forced to purchase efficient products
Objective: Nudging consumers into efficient products
Measure	Strengths	Weaknesses
Advertising efficiency	- increases demand for efficient technologies by positioning them as life style products that reveal social status	- risk of rebound effects
Provision of complementary information	- provides consumers with important knowledge, e.g., past trends of electricity and fuel prices covering a time span that matches the lifetime of products	- requires continuous monitoring and updating
Education and awareness campaigns	- helps consumers understand costs, benefits, and trade-offs	- accuracy of information is crucial; once lost, consumer’s trust is difficult to regain
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